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“If it moves, tax it. 
If it still moves, regulate it. 
If it stops moving, subsidise it.” 
 
Attributed to former United States President Ronald Reagan 
 
 
And if all else fails, nationalise it?  
AGENDA 
1. A little regulatory history 
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4. Lessons from New Zealand 
 
 
1. A LITTLE REGULATORY HISTORY 
NEW ZEALAND: A MARKET TO WATCH? 
1987 
 
First country in the OECD to rely primarily on 
Competition Law to govern network industries 
– including privatised former government firms: telecoms, 
electricity, railway, airline, airports 
But not an ‘unregulated Wild West’ 
– special provisions for dominant firms (Part IV, Commerce 
Act 1987 
– contractual undertakings  between government and 
newly-privatised firms 
• e.g. ‘Kiwi Shares’ for Telecom, Air New Zealand  
OBSERVATIONS 
Not clear that it was less efficient (both statically and 
dynamically) than industry specific regulation 
– in Telecoms, at least 
• Ministerial Inquiry (2000), Howell (2007) 
But industry-specific regulation introduced anyway 
– claim: to make the market ‘more competitive’ 
– but statutory effect was to constrain the dominant firm 
• Telecommunications Act 2001 
– names firm to be subject to regulation (Telecom/Chorus) 
– prescribes regulated products and pricing methodologies (including 
the network on which they are offered) 
– single nationwide focus 
REGULATORY RATCHETING 
2001 – interconnection, wholesale access to voice 
products 
– data regulation eschewed due to extant and expanding 
infrastructure competition 
2004 – bitstream unbundling 
– interim measure as incumbent planned nationwide FTTN 
(2007) 
2006 – full local loop unbundling (‘ladder of investment’) 
– market not ‘competitive enough’; FTTN behind schedule 
• broadband connections exceeded target by 11%, but only 25% sold 
by competitors – competitors promise ‘ladder’ investments 
2007 – functional separation 
– before first unbundled connection sold 
INVESTMENT STRIKE 
2007 (June) 
– FTTN investments delayed by regulatory activity 
– incumbent will only provide $500 million of estimated $1.5 
billion under current regulatory arrangements 
– threat made credible when $1 billion returned to 
shareholders 
A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION 
2007 (November) 
– Government announces incumbent undertaking to supply 
FTTN network connecting all communities with more than 
500 lines to minimum 20 Mbps broadband speeds by 2011 
2007 (December) 
– copper access prices revised upwards 
 
FTTN delivered ‘on time’ (by 2007 timetable) and on 
(2007) budget 
2. A LITTLE SUBSIDY STORY 
NEW ZEALAND: A MARKET TO WATCH? 
2008 General Election  
National Party-led minority  government promises 
Government-subsidised ‘nationwide’ FTTH network 
– 75% of residences to have access to 100Mbps by 2018 
Delivered by Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
– Government funds $1.5b of $4 to $6 billion project 
– ‘capital recycling’ model 
Criterion for participating:  
– full structural separation of network and retail operations 
– including copper network if incumbent is a partner 
‘JUST BUILD THE NETWORK’ 
2008 – policy announced 
2009 – Crown Fibre Holdings established to oversee PPPs 
– September 2009 draft terms released 
• 33 separate geographic areas; G-PON; open access Layer 1 dark 
fibre; structurally separate network firm (including incumbent’s 
copper network if it is a successful tenderer); ‘capital recycling’ 
model 
2010 January 29 – tenders close 
– 33 respondents – incumbent but no other telecoms market 
participants 
• despite having around 50% share in mature broadband market 
• and most having infrastructure investments (backhaul, etc) 
  
‘JUST BUILD THE NETWORK’ (cont) 
2010 July 8– change to tender rules announced 
– open access to bundled Layer 1 and Layer 2  
– only existing tenderers could resubmit 
– ‘winners’ recommended to Parliament in late October 
2010 September 9 – preferred partner for 24% of 
project (18% of national broadband market announced) 
–  NOT THE INCUMBENT! 
2010 October 15 – submissions due on revised 
Telecommunications Act 
– identity of successful fibre tenderers, not deemed relevant 
– only ‘problem’ was how to set copper prices if Chorus was 
a tenderer 
‘JUST BUILD THE NETWORK’ (cont) 
2011 May 24 – remaining ‘UFB Partners’ announced 
– Chorus the partner for only 70% of project (50% of 
addressable broadband market); different rules (more risk) 
• Chorus gets Auckland (population 1.5 million => no infrastructure 
competition 
• competitor contracts for many small towns (e.g. Hawera, population 
11,500) => FTTN, fibre infrastructure competition 
• Christchurch (earthquakes Feb 22 2011, Sep 4 2010) goes to 
competitor => new copper connections (plus competing DOCSIS-3.0 
connections) relaid in areas not covered by immediate fibre build 
plan  
2011 June 30 – assent of revised Telecommunications Act 
– only substantive change is ‘retail minus’ copper prices 
replaced by benchmark, TSLRIC 
AT A REALLY ‘GOOD’ PRICE 
Chorus had absolute cost advantage (FTTN network) 
Crown Fibre let contracts in two stages to ensure 
Chorus ‘sharpened its pencil’ 
– substantial share of contracts (24%) let pre-emptively early 
to non-Chorus bidder to signal willingness to strand Chorus 
FTTN investments if tendered price not ‘right’ 
– but never likely that Chorus would not get a significant 
share of the build 
• total cost otherwise would have been very much higher 
• and would have guaranteed aggressive price competition from 
copper against fibre, undermining fibre project  
EARLY SUCCESS? 
“One of the rewarding things about our UFB programme 
has been the high levels of international praise for how 
our roll-out is progressing, particularly compared to 
some of the other international programmes”   
              Communications Minister Amy Adams, 8 August 2013 
– 20% of network built 
– but less than 3% uptake by premises passed 
– “by comparison, in Singapore uptake was about 2 per cent 
when 20 per cent of the network was built and in the UK, 
uptake was about 3 per cent when 24 per cent of the 
network was built”  
– Japan? Korea? 
3. A GIANT PROBLEM 
WHAT MS ADAMS DIDN’T SAY 
An industry in near complete disarray 
– impasse as draft regulatory decision on future copper 
access price (proposed 30% decrease for unbundled 
bitstream) threatens business case for fibre investment 
– collapse in the share price of (separated) copper 
incumbent Chorus 
– international capital flight from Chorus (from 75% to 
around 45% of shareholding in less than five months) 
– threatened government override of regulatory decision  
– consumer (and voter) backlash at denial of (possible) 
lower copper prices if government intervention occurs 
 
HOW DID IT COME TO THIS? 
To an economist, the answer is simple 
 
No clear competition policy 
No consistent regulatory framework 
– because how can you regulate anything when you don’t 
know what the you are trying to achieve? 
Many different regulatory silos 
And no cohesive policy oversight to prevent the 
debacle 
 
 
FIBRE SUBSIDIES: 
A ‘SOLUTION’ LOOKING FOR A ‘PROBLEM’ 
‘Missing market’ for investment? NO 
– 2007 NGN undertaking between Chorus and Government  
• all communities with 500 or more lines would have access to 
20Mbps by December 2011 
International envy? PROBABLY! 
– keeping up with the Jonses/Kims/Watanabes 
(Australia/Korea/Japan) in the ‘fibre arms race’? 
– a “step change in the provision of broadband services” delivering 
economic growth, productivity improvements and “increase(ing) New 
Zealand’s global competitiveness, particularly compared to other OECD 
countries”    Communications Minister Steven Joyce, 2010 
Political motivations? UNDOUBTEDLY 
 
BUT THAT DOES NOT EXCUSE POOR POLICY 
How did policy-makers allow this to occur? 
 
Why did they not ‘see it coming’? 
 
REGULATORY SILOS: FIBRE 
“Crown Fibre Holdings monitors compliance with the terms of 
the Ultra-Fast Broadband Initiative while the network is being 
built. This includes oversight of price caps, products, network 
construction and operation (especially quality assurance testing), 
as well as the Government’s investment in shares, financial 
instruments and governance.” 
» http://www.crownfibre.govt.nz/publications/regulatory/  
“The Commerce Commission monitors and enforces the deeds 
of undertakings made by the government’s Ultra-Fast 
Broadband partners, as well as other aspects of the 
Telecommunications Act 2001” 
» Ibid  
 
REGULATORY SILOS: COPPER 
“We have no statutory role in promoting or protecting 
fibre,” says Gale. “Our task in this larger project is just 
to fix the price of copper-based services. Retail service 
providers will then compete on whatever network they 
find most profitable.” 
   Telecommunications Commissioner 
» http://computerworld.co.nz/news.nsf/news/new-wholesale-price-for-
access-to-copper-network  
 
WHO GOVERNS THE BROADBAND MARKET? 
Irrelevant when the overriding purpose (and statutory 
context) of regulation is to constrain the enduringly 
dominant firm, not oversee the development of 
competitive interaction within a market 
– hence Telecommunications Act 2001 
• names the firm and the network being regulated 
• specifies the products 
• identifies the pricing methodologies to use 
• instructs the Commissioner to get on with it 
• and specifically prevents  
– does not allow for  
• management of infrastructure competition 
• transition of dominance between firms 
SUBSEQUENT REGULATIONS 
Bolted regulatory artefacts onto the 2001 architecture 
– assuming enduring dominance by the regulated firm 
– even though local infrastructure competition already 
present in some (retail) markets 
In this view,  
– Chorus will be enduringly dominant in copper markets 
– UFBCos enduringly dominant in fibre markets 
– only relevant market is the wholesale one 
– therefore no ‘problem’ 
• equivalent access (promoting services competition on each 
infrastructure) is sufficient for normal competitive interaction to  
drive fibre uptake 
 
AND IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN … 
Except that when one of the networks is subsidised, the 
regulated prices (on the subsidised network at least) 
can NEVER be cost-based! 
– UFBCo (nationwide) fibre ‘prices’ set in 2010 so as to be 
‘competitively neutral’ with prevailing (nationwide) 
wholesale copper prices (so not cost-based at all) 
– any change to the copper price destabilises the ‘artificially 
competitive’ balance between networks 
• when instigated by the regulator meeting statutory obligations, is 
in effect the government breaching the PPP agreements 
 
 
 
SUBSIDY MOTIVATION NOW CRUCIAL 
Fibre investment to provide infrastructure competition to 
copper 
 falling copper price no ‘problem’  
except that taxpayers will pay more for fibre network as substitution 
delayed (capital recycling will not occur, loans to Chorus not repaid)  
Fibre investment to facilitate rapid substitution from 
copper to fibre 
falling copper price a real problem  
prolongs life of copper network; delays revenues to be accrued from 
fibre network; exposes Chorus to additional financial risks 
and devalues compensation paid to copper operator for abnormally 
early closure of the network (in those areas where copper operator is 
not the UFB partner, at least) 
 
 
REVISITING THE PPP CONTRACTS 
Bid prices based on equalised copper and fibre prices for 
equivalent services when bids called in early 2010 
Non-Chorus bidders 
– no existing market participant apart from the incumbent bid 
– price bid unequivocally subsidised network build cost only 
Chorus 
–  bid price is build cost plus compensation for regulatory 
takings for forced early closure of copper network as a 
consequence of government fibre investment 
– will differ depending upon how much of the addressable 
market and in which areas Chorus expects to get contracts 
THE COMPETITIVE REALITY 
At least 6 different market structures 
– areas where government fibre will not be deployed (30% 
of market) – copper must endure indefinitely 
• with and without other effectively competitive infrastructure 
(satellite, LTE, etc) 
– fibre areas (75% of market)  
• Chorus supplies copper and fibre => short term infrastructure 
competition, cut rapid substitution and decommissioning copper 
(70% of the fibre market, 50% of broadband market) 
• Chorus supplies copper and competitor supplies fibre => enduring 
infrastructure competition 
– both of above, with and without infrastructure 
competition (cable, rival fibre, LTE etc)  
 
ONE COPPER PRICE TO RULE THEM ALL? 
Which of the six markets is the single price set to 
calibrate? 
– one single nationwide copper price will be ‘wrong’ for at 
least 5 of the 6 markets 
December 3 2012 
– Commission proposes internationally-benchmarked 
copper access price  
• 30% lower than 2010 prices used when setting fibre bids 
• unilateral breach of  good faith w.r.t. PPP contracts 
– will delay fibre uptake rate => non-Chorus firms will not meet rollout 
targets as capital will not ‘recycle’ as fast as expected 
– devalues Chorus’ compensation for ‘regulatory takings’ 
 
GOVERNMENT BREACHED PPP TERMS 
Chorus, other investors legitimately believed the 
government would not allow copper prices to deviate 
from early 2010 levels 
Regulator’s actions have led to government breaching 
PPP agreements 
Government could have intervened immediately 
– threatened, but no action until February 8 2013 
– ‘action’ turned out to be ‘inaction’ 
• a regulatory review, which was not begun until August 2013 
– result was collapse in Chorus share price, foreign capital 
flight 
• investing in NZ ‘too hard/too risky’ 
• Government ‘can’t be trusted’ 
 
PROPOSED ‘REVIEW SOLUTION’ 
Set (single, nationwide) copper price using 2010 fibre bid 
price as the cost of an equivalent modern network as per 
TSLRIC 
But which fibre price? 
Chorus price (including compensation for early closure)? 
– ‘wrong’ price for non-Chorus fibre areas (too high) 
Non-Chorus price  
– ‘wrong’ price for Chorus fibre areas (too low) 
Any fibre price 
– ‘wrong’ for non-fibre areas  
• crowds out future copper investment  
• wrong price signal for other entry (e.g. LTE) 
WHAT CAN BE DONE NOW? 
More patching  of ‘bad existing regulation’ not an option 
– must start with a clean slate  
– governing today’s markets, not yesterday’s or ‘tomorrow’s’ 
– but forward-looking so adaptable to changing circumstances 
Separate geographic markets regulated according to 
current competitive realities 
– incentives to achieve government policy objectives can be 
calibrated differently for different competitive environments 
Government buyout of all private investments so 
taxpayers, not investors, bear risks of (poor) government 
policy-making (the ‘Australian’ solution)??? 
STOP PRESS!!! 
5 November (Guy Fawkes Day) 
– Commerce Commission releases ‘final’ copper price 
decision 
• $34.44 (higher than December 3 price, but lower than 
recommended $37.50 to $42.50 
7 November 
– Minister announces Ministerial Inquiry into Chorus!!! 
• focus on financial position and ability to deliver on contractual 
undertakings under UFB (and RBI) 
• no brief to consider policy environment 
 
THE REACTION 
THE LOWEST PRICE SINCE SEPARATION 
THE MARKET HAS SPOKEN 
Moodys has put Chorus’s Baa2 rating on review 
– already on ‘watch’ after December 3 2012 
– Baa2 is second-lowest investment-grade rating 
 
“The rating review reflects the material impact which the 
regulatory decision will have on Chorus’s financial profile,” 
    Moody’s senior analyst Maurice O’Connell 
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU1311/S00171/chorus-credit-rating-
on-review-for-downgrade-by-moodys.htm  
4. LESSONS FROM NEW ZEALAND 
SUBSIDIES AREN’T SIMPLE 
Subsidies really are the enemy of competition 
 
Subsidised fibre networks do not descend into a 
competitive vacuum 
– will always override property rights in extant networks 
• primarily copper, but what about cable, satellite, fixed wireless 
etc? 
– necessarily invoke issues of compensation for regulatory 
takings 
• ignore them at your peril! 
 
 
WHAT CAN EUROPE LEARN? 
State Aid rules make an NZ-type outcome less likely 
– but any state subsidy alters incentives 
Any State investment must be addressing a specific 
market ‘problem’ 
– clarity of objective, ensuring consistency of competitive 
interaction and policy objectives are non-negotiable’ 
• investing just to ‘get a fibre network’ is not sufficient  
When regulating for infrastructure competition 
– separate geographic markets are unavoidable if appropriate 
incentives are to be applied across all networks and all 
operators 
 
WHAT CAN EUROPE LEARN (cont)? 
Path dependency influences regulatory frameworks 
– risk of ‘frame blindness’ must be overcome 
Regulators are ultimate custodians of sector strategy 
– may be strongly influenced by integrated incumbent firms 
– structural separation disincentives sector participants from 
taking responsibility for sector strategy 
• missing market for co-ordination 
• increases responsibility for regulators, policy-makers for 
determining direction 
Beware of doing deals with governments!  
THANK YOU 
